GRINO v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672 (Digested Case)

GRINO v. COMELEC

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: Petitioners alleged in substance that respondent acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras from voting for the governor and vice governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of Iloilo. Petitioners further alleged that when R.A. 7160 was passed providing specifically for the creation of existing sub-provinces into a fullfledged province, it did not specifically provide that the voters of the sub-province shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials who, in case of a vote against its conversion into a regular province, would continue to represent said sub-province. Furthermore, respondent failed to inform the candidates and the voters of such disenfranchisement.

ISSUE:

(1) WON the act of the COMELEC in disallowing the voters of the subprovince of Guimaras to vote for certain officials is with legal basis.

(2) WON the petition for intervention of the petitioners should be granted.

HELD: No. The respondent was under mistaken presumption that under Sec. 462 of the 1991 LGC, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the President will fill up the positions of provincial officials through appointment until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. The law however is clear that in case of a negative vote, the elected officials of the sub-province only shall be appointed by the President. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by registered voters of Iloilo province including the sub-province of Guimaras. However, it would serve no useful purpose if We undo all that the COMELEC had done in that plebiscite. It is more relevant to deal with the facts actually obtaining in the instant case. In the recently conducted plebiscite, the voters of the sub-province of Iloilo overwhelmingly voted for the approval of the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province. In this event, the President shall appoint, as in fact he already did appoint according to newspaper reports, the governor for the newly created province of Guimaras, and he shall also appoint a vice-governor and the member of the sangguniang panlalawigan in accordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of R.A. 6170. The then sub-province of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically independent from the province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis for the calling of a special election for the municipalities of Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia for the purpose of electing the governor and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district thereof.

(2) No. The court issued a resolution denying the motion for intervention filed by Legaspi, Garin, Acanto, Javellana, Fernandez, Araneta, Salcedo and Tedoco because it had previously lifted the temporary restraining order and considering that they were not directly affected by the principal issue in the main petition which involved only the positions of governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district of Iloilo.

PADILLA v. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735 (Digested Case)

PADILLA v. COMELEC

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: Pursuant to RA 7155 and Resolution No. 2312 enacted by the respondent, the respondent conducted a plebiscite in both the proposed municipality and the mother municipality. In the plebiscite, the creation of the proposed municipality was declared rejected. Petitioner herein contends that the plebiscite is invalid because the Constitution requires that the plebiscite should only be conducted in the areas comprising the proposed municipality. He claimed further that the ruling in Tan v. COMELEC has been abandoned by the Court, readopting the ruling in Paredes v. COMELEC, and that this is justified  by the deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor.

ISSUE:

(1) WON respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.

(2) WON the plebsicite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed municipality and the remaining areas of the mother municipality is valid.

(3) WON the court readopted the ruling in Paredes v. COMELEC.

HELD:

(1) No. We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality, is valid.

(2) Yes. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

(3) No. Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or". The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected the ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC.

TAN v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727 (Digested Case)

TAN v. COMELEC

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, filed a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents from conducting the plebiscite which was scheduled "to be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected, excluding the original province."

ISSUES: WON the law is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the LGC as in Art. XI, Sec. 3, of the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The cited provision plainly provides that, "no province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The phrase "the unit or units affected" refers to both the original province and the new province sought to be created as these political groups will both be affected. Hence, the two must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC (Digested Case)

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

Re: Authority to Create LGUs

FACTS: The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. In the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was passed ammending Sec. 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 which sought to exempt from the income requirement the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving  Joint Resolution No. 29. In the 13th Congress, the Lower House re-adopted JR 29 as JR 1 which was also not approved by the Senate. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. These bills were approved by the Congress which later lapsed into law upon the failure of the President to sign the same.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the Cityhood Laws violate Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) WON the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

HELD:

(1) Yes. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

(2) Yes. Even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause, as there is no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause.

CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 161414 (Case Digest)

CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Re: Municipal Corporations

FACTS: Among the EOs annuled in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General was EO No. 107 creating the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner herein contends that Andong is still in existence and the same is evidenced by the presence chairmen in its 17 barangays, public officials, high school, etc.

ISSUES:

(1) WON a municipality, such as Andong, whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.

(2) WON Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal corporation.

HELD:

(1) No. The Municipality of Andong never existed as EO N0. 107 establishing Andong was declared void ab initio (from inception) by the court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General. Further, the Pelaez case was never reversed by the court but was rather affirmed in many cases. Finally, No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

(2) No. We have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL, G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 (Case Digest)

PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL

Re: Municipal Corporation

FACTS: Then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao after the legislative bills creating said municipalities failed to pass Congress. The former Pres. justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioner contended that the EOs are null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by RA 2370, and that said orders constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.

FACTS: WON the EOs are valid.

HELD: No. The EOs are null and void as Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. Further, the nullity of the issueances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over LGUs to mere general supervision. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.

*Note Bene: The power to create municipal corporations is purely legislative and not an administrative power. The Congress enjoys this power. The provincial board, however, acting on a delegated power, may create barrios within their jurisdiction subject to the requirements set forth in the LGC.

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ROMULO (Digested Case)

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ROMULO

Re: Principle of Local Autonomy

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (?5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE: WON said provisos violate the constitutional precept on local autonomy.

HELD: Yes. The Constitution (Sec. 6, Art X) and the LGC 1991 (Sec. 18) explicitly provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to them without need of further action. Hence, the provisos imposing conditions for the release of LGU funds are unconstitutional.