CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 161414 (Case Digest)

CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Re: Municipal Corporations

FACTS: Among the EOs annuled in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General was EO No. 107 creating the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner herein contends that Andong is still in existence and the same is evidenced by the presence chairmen in its 17 barangays, public officials, high school, etc.

ISSUES:

(1) WON a municipality, such as Andong, whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.

(2) WON Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal corporation.

HELD:

(1) No. The Municipality of Andong never existed as EO N0. 107 establishing Andong was declared void ab initio (from inception) by the court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General. Further, the Pelaez case was never reversed by the court but was rather affirmed in many cases. Finally, No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

(2) No. We have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."