PLAZA II v. CASSION, 435 SCRA 294 (Digested Case)

PLAZA II v. CASSION

Re: Devolution (Sec. 17 & 24, LGC 1991)

FACTS: Upon the implementation of the LGC, some functions of agencies, like that of the DSWD, were devolved to LGUs. The City Council of Butuan passed a resolution authorizing its mayor to sign an MOA for the devolution of the DSWD to the city. Pursuant to said MOA, the services, personnel. assets and liabilities and technical support systems of DSWD were transferred to its city counterpart. By virtue of the same MOA, the mayor issued an EO, reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 national DSWD employees headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon who was also designated as OIC of CSSDO. The CSSDO was originally composed of herein respondents, headed by Carolina M. Cassion. Aggrieved by such development, they refused to recognize petitioner Tuazon as their new head and to report at the DSWD building. They contended that the issuance of the reconstituting EOby Mayor Plaza and the designation of petitioner Tuazon as Officer-in-charge of the CSSDO are illegal. Despite Mayor Plazas series of orders to respondents to report for work at the DSWD building, they failed to do so. Because of this, Mayor Plaza issued an order dropping respondents from the rolls pursuant to the CSC Memorandum Circular.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the dropping of respondents from the roll is legal.

(2) WON respondents were denied due process for lack of notice and hearing.

(3) WON  the contention of respondents that it was really the intention of the mayor to systematically remove them was meritorious.

(4) WON the EO was valid.

(5) WON respondents' right to security of tenure has been violated as they were transferred without their consent.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The CSC Memorandum Circular provides that, "officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) and may be dropped from the service without prior notice."

(2)  No. The separation of an employee who is dropped from the rolls is a non-disciplinary action wherein the respondent is entitled to notice and hearing. In the above-quoted provision, an officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls if he was continuously absent without official leave for a period of at least thirty days. Prior notice is not necessary.

(3) No. No evidence was submitted by the appellants to support such contention.

(4) Yes. Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets and liabilities, records of basic services, and facilities of a national government agency to local government units. Under this Code, the term devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. Furthemore,  devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer. It is thus clear that Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue the EO in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the LGC. As the local chief executive, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head, as was done by the Mayor here. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1992, provides further that heads of departments appointed by the local chief executive must have the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanggunian concerned. While initially, the Sanggunian rejected petitioner Tuazons appointment as the City Government Department Head II of the CSSDO, however, it later confirmed her appointment.

(5) No. There was no such transfer. Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service and may be imposed as an administrative penalty. The change of respondents place of work from the original CSSDO office to the DSWD building is not a transfer. It was only a physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service. There were no new movements or appointments from one position to another.

BINAY v. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991 (Digested Case)

BINAY v. DOMINGO

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: The Municipality of Makati passed a resolution extending financial assistance to a bereaved family whose gross income does not exceed P2000  a month. The resolution was referred to respondent COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA disapproved the resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. COA's objection is of the position that there is no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under the resolution and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc., of the inhabitants of Makati. COA's also argued that. "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case."

ISSUES:

(1) WON the resolution of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

(2) WON the classification of pauper beneficiaries is violative of  the equal protection clause in the constitution.

HELD:

(1) Yes. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

(2) No. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

SOLICITOR GENERAL v. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (MMA), 204 SCRA 837 (Digested Case)

SOLICITOR GENERAL v. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (MMA)

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: In the Gonong Case 1990, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. In the case at bar, the MMA issued an ordinance authorizing itself to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. On the other hand, private petitioners herein contended that the ordinance passed by MMA and the provisions of the decision in the Gonong Case were conflicting. The MMA argued that there was no conflict between the two. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why the ordinance was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the ordinance cannot be attacked collaterally.

(2) WON there was valid delegation of legislative power to MMA.

(3) WON the ordinance of MMA is valid.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.

(2) Yes. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

(3) No. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanction. MMA and LGUs are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

TATEL v. MUNICIPALTIY OF VIRAC, 207 SCRA 837 (Digested Case)

TATEL v. MUNICIPALTIY OF VIRAC

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: On the basis of complaints received from the residents, against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed, declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Ordinance No. 13 is valid.

(2) WON the appelate court erred in giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses.

(3) WON the appelate court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous establishments similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but which are not prosecuted.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The ordinance was passed by the municipal council in exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the LGC.

(2) No. The ambiguity therein therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government.

(3) No. As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.

TANO v. SOCRATES, 278 SCRA 154 (Digested Case)

TANO v. SOCRATES

Re: General principles (Sec. 1-5, LGC1991)

FACTS: The City Council of Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City for 5 years. In the same light, the Provincial Council of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling, and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating said ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit; and that the Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways

ISSUES: WON the assailed ordinances and resolution are valid.

HELD: Yes. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance. Further, one of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.[30] This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES, 234 SCRA 255 (Digested Case)

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES

Re: General principles (Sec. 1-5, LGC 1991)

FACTS: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. It enacted ordinances which both prohibit the issuance of business permit and cancel existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino, and impose penalty thereto. The petitioners argue that LGUs may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: WON LGUs are empowered to enact ordinances prohibiting the operation of PAGCOR within the formers' jurisdiction.

HELD: No. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress "only" those forms of "gambling prohibited" by law. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

EVARDONE v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464 (Digested Case)

EVARDONE v. COMELEC

Re: General principles (Sec. 1-5, LGC 1991)

FACTS: Petitioner Evardone is the mayor of Municipality of Sulat. Herein respondents filed a petition for recall with the Office of the Local Election Registrar (LER) in said municipality against said mayor. The respondent COMELEC issued a resolution, approving the recommendation of the LER, to hold the signing of the petition for recall. On July 10, 1990, Evardone prayed for a TRO which was favorably issued on July 12, 1990. On the same day, July 12, the TRO was received by the central office of COMELEC. But it was only in July 15 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of the signing process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO. Thereafter, the respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court. The COMELEC held that the critical date to consider is the service or notice of the Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the Commission on Election, and not upon its agent in the field. Evardone however argued that the resolution earlier issued by respondent is null and void as he maintained that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the adoption of the 1987 Constitution abrogated the provisions of BP 337, and therefore, COMELEC indeed has no basis in conducting the recall.

(2) WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant to the questioned resolution.

HELD:

(1)  No. Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. RA 7160 providing for the LGC 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals BP 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the LGC 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old LGC (BP 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new LGC, the effectiveness of BP 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.  Thus, the COMELEC was vested the power to promulgate the questioned resolution.

(2) No. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the respondent COMELEC and Apelado, et al. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary, there is no turning back the clock. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect. However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states: (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official's assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

NB: Petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

MALABANG v. BENITO, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969 (Digested Case)

Re: De facto municipal corporation

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of EO 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, which created the Municipality of Balabagan out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. Petitioner relied on the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General while respondent contended that  that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.

WON:

(1) WON the controverted matter may be attacked collateraly.

(2) WON EO 386 is constitutional.

HELD:

(1) Yes. It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporations. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.

(2) No. In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other "valid law" giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is "no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation".

Juanito Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995 (Digested Case)

Re: Based on verifiable indicators of viability/projected capacity

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the Municipality of Makati to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. Petitioners contend that the special law did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction of Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials; that it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law; that the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with the population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and the LGC.

HELD:

(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials.

(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census.

(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill.

(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.

HELD:

(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The court take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary dispute.

(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.

(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.

LOPEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-56022, May 31, 1985 (Digested Case)

LOPEZ v. COMELEC (1985)

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: After a referedum in 1975 wherein residents of the Greater Manila area authorized the  President to restructure the local governments of the four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of government, PD 824 was issued by the President creating a public corporation to be known as the Metropolitan Manila vested with the powers and attributes of a corporation. Petitioners herein assailed the constitutionality of PD 824 relying on the provision of the LGC (enacted in 1983): "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected".

ISSUES:

(1) WON PD 824 is unconstitutional.

(2) WON PD 824 violated the equal protection clause of the constitution.

HELD:

(1) No. The doubt on the creation of PD 824 has been removed by the present Constitutional provision and in the Article on Batasang Pambansa that both recognized the existence of the Metropolitan Manila. Furthermore, the plebiscite conducted in 1975 manifested the will of the residence of the area which thus satisfied the provision relied upon by petitioners. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.

(2) No. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. It is clear that under the equal protection clause, classification is not forbidden. As was so well put by Justice Laurel as ponente in the leading case People v. Vera: "Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted." Here, PD 824 has complied with the requirements of valid classification.

*Nota Bene: The president may only excercise general supervision over Metropolitan Manila, contrary to what was previously stipulated therein granting the president the power to control it.

GRINO v. COMELEC, 213 SCRA 672 (Digested Case)

GRINO v. COMELEC

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: Petitioners alleged in substance that respondent acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras from voting for the governor and vice governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan representing the second district of Iloilo. Petitioners further alleged that when R.A. 7160 was passed providing specifically for the creation of existing sub-provinces into a fullfledged province, it did not specifically provide that the voters of the sub-province shall no longer be allowed to vote for the provincial officials who, in case of a vote against its conversion into a regular province, would continue to represent said sub-province. Furthermore, respondent failed to inform the candidates and the voters of such disenfranchisement.

ISSUE:

(1) WON the act of the COMELEC in disallowing the voters of the subprovince of Guimaras to vote for certain officials is with legal basis.

(2) WON the petition for intervention of the petitioners should be granted.

HELD: No. The respondent was under mistaken presumption that under Sec. 462 of the 1991 LGC, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in a plebiscite, the President will fill up the positions of provincial officials through appointment until their successors shall have been elected and qualified. The law however is clear that in case of a negative vote, the elected officials of the sub-province only shall be appointed by the President. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the sub-province of Guimaras shall continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the province of Iloilo elected at large by registered voters of Iloilo province including the sub-province of Guimaras. However, it would serve no useful purpose if We undo all that the COMELEC had done in that plebiscite. It is more relevant to deal with the facts actually obtaining in the instant case. In the recently conducted plebiscite, the voters of the sub-province of Iloilo overwhelmingly voted for the approval of the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province. In this event, the President shall appoint, as in fact he already did appoint according to newspaper reports, the governor for the newly created province of Guimaras, and he shall also appoint a vice-governor and the member of the sangguniang panlalawigan in accordance with the third paragraph of Section 462 of R.A. 6170. The then sub-province of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically independent from the province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis for the calling of a special election for the municipalities of Buenavista, Jordan and Nueva Valencia for the purpose of electing the governor and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district thereof.

(2) No. The court issued a resolution denying the motion for intervention filed by Legaspi, Garin, Acanto, Javellana, Fernandez, Araneta, Salcedo and Tedoco because it had previously lifted the temporary restraining order and considering that they were not directly affected by the principal issue in the main petition which involved only the positions of governor, vice-governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second district of Iloilo.

PADILLA v. COMELEC, 214 SCRA 735 (Digested Case)

PADILLA v. COMELEC

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: Pursuant to RA 7155 and Resolution No. 2312 enacted by the respondent, the respondent conducted a plebiscite in both the proposed municipality and the mother municipality. In the plebiscite, the creation of the proposed municipality was declared rejected. Petitioner herein contends that the plebiscite is invalid because the Constitution requires that the plebiscite should only be conducted in the areas comprising the proposed municipality. He claimed further that the ruling in Tan v. COMELEC has been abandoned by the Court, readopting the ruling in Paredes v. COMELEC, and that this is justified  by the deletion of the phrase "unit or" in Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution from its precursor.

ISSUE:

(1) WON respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Resolution No. 2312.

(2) WON the plebsicite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed municipality and the remaining areas of the mother municipality is valid.

(3) WON the court readopted the ruling in Paredes v. COMELEC.

HELD:

(1) No. We rule that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse in promulgating Resolution No. 2312 and that the plebiscite, which rejected the creation of the proposed Municipality, is valid.

(2) Yes. It stands to reason that when the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte.

(3) No. Petitioner's contention that our ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC has been superseded with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, thus reinstating our earlier ruling in Paredes vs. COMELEC is untenable. Petitioner opines that since Tan vs. COMELEC was based on Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution our ruling in said case is no longer applicable under Section 10 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution, 8 especially since the latter provision deleted the words "unit or". The deletion of the phrase "unit or" in the 1987 Constitution from its precursor, Section 3 of Article XI of the 1973 Constitution not affected the ruling in Tan vs. COMELEC.

TAN v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727 (Digested Case)

TAN v. COMELEC

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, Petitioners herein, who are residents of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, filed a case for Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents from conducting the plebiscite which was scheduled "to be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected, excluding the original province."

ISSUES: WON the law is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the LGC as in Art. XI, Sec. 3, of the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The cited provision plainly provides that, "no province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The phrase "the unit or units affected" refers to both the original province and the new province sought to be created as these political groups will both be affected. Hence, the two must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC (Digested Case)

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COMELEC

Re: Authority to Create LGUs

FACTS: The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. In the 12th Congress, RA 9009 was passed ammending Sec. 450 of the LGC by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 to P100 million. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 which sought to exempt from the income requirement the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving  Joint Resolution No. 29. In the 13th Congress, the Lower House re-adopted JR 29 as JR 1 which was also not approved by the Senate. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. These bills were approved by the Congress which later lapsed into law upon the failure of the President to sign the same.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the Cityhood Laws violate Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution.

(2) WON the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.

HELD:

(1) Yes. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.

(2) Yes. Even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause, as there is no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause.

CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, G.R. No. 161414 (Case Digest)

CAMID v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Re: Municipal Corporations

FACTS: Among the EOs annuled in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General was EO No. 107 creating the Municipality of Andong. Petitioner herein contends that Andong is still in existence and the same is evidenced by the presence chairmen in its 17 barangays, public officials, high school, etc.

ISSUES:

(1) WON a municipality, such as Andong, whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by this Court may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute.

(2) WON Andong is entitled to recognition as de facto municipal corporation.

HELD:

(1) No. The Municipality of Andong never existed as EO N0. 107 establishing Andong was declared void ab initio (from inception) by the court in the case of Pelaez v. Auditor General. Further, the Pelaez case was never reversed by the court but was rather affirmed in many cases. Finally, No subsequent legislation has been passed since 1965 creating a Municipality of Andong. Given these facts, there is hardly any reason to elaborate why Andong does not exist as a duly constituted municipality.

(2) No. We have since held that where a municipality created as such by executive order is later impliedly recognized and its acts are accorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In Municipality of San Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., this Court considered the following factors as having validated the creation of a municipal corporation, which, like the Municipality of Sinacaban, was created by executive order of the President before the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General: (1) the fact that for nearly 30 years the validity of the creation of the municipality had never been challenged; (2) the fact that following the ruling in Pelaez no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the executive order creating such municipality; and (3) the fact that the municipality was later classified as a fifth class municipality, organized as part of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitution apportioning the seats in the House of Representatives. Above all, it was held that whatever doubt there might be as to the de jure character of the municipality must be deemed to have been put to rest by the Local Government Code of 1991 (R. A. No. 7160), 442(d) of which provides that "municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of elective officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities."

PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL, G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965 (Case Digest)

PELAEZ v. AUDITOR GENERAL

Re: Municipal Corporation

FACTS: Then Pres. Diosdado Macapagal issued several EOs creating 33 municipalities in Mindanao after the legislative bills creating said municipalities failed to pass Congress. The former Pres. justified the creation of these municipalities citing his powers under Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code. Petitioner contended that the EOs are null and void, Sec. 68 having been repealed by RA 2370, and that said orders constituted an undue delegation of legislative power.

FACTS: WON the EOs are valid.

HELD: No. The EOs are null and void as Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code did not meet the well-settled requirements for a valid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. Further, the nullity of the issueances was the consequence of the enactment of the 1935 Constitution which reduced the power of the Chief Executive over LGUs to mere general supervision. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local governments, so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law, although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a decision of the corresponding provincial board.

*Note Bene: The power to create municipal corporations is purely legislative and not an administrative power. The Congress enjoys this power. The provincial board, however, acting on a delegated power, may create barrios within their jurisdiction subject to the requirements set forth in the LGC.

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ROMULO (Digested Case)

PROVINCE OF BATANGAS v. ROMULO

Re: Principle of Local Autonomy

FACTS: Petitioner filed a petition to declare as unconstitutional and void certain provisos contained in the General Appropriations Acts (GAA) of 1999, 2000 and 2001, insofar as they uniformly earmarked for each corresponding year the amount of five billion pesos (?5,000,000,000.00) of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the Local Government Service Equalization Fund (LGSEF) and imposed conditions for the release thereof.

ISSUE: WON said provisos violate the constitutional precept on local autonomy.

HELD: Yes. The Constitution (Sec. 6, Art X) and the LGC 1991 (Sec. 18) explicitly provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically and directly released to them without need of further action. Hence, the provisos imposing conditions for the release of LGU funds are unconstitutional.

MMDA. v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. No. 135962

M.M.D.A. v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.

G.R. No. 135962

Re: Principle of Local Autonomy

FACTS: Petitioner is a government agency tasked with the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. Respondent is a non-stock, non-profit corporation whose members are homeowners in Bel-Air Village, a private subdivision in Makati City. Respondent BAVA is the registered owner of Neptune Street, a road inside Bel-Air Village which is sought to be opened to public vehicular traffic by petitioner pursuant to an order issued by the latter.

ISSUES:

(1) WON petitioner has the power and mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.

(2) WON the passage of an ordinance is a condition precedent before the MMDA may order the opening of subdivision roads to public traffic.

HELD:

(1) The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Hence, it does not have the power to issue such order to herein respondent.

(2) Yes. The MMDA, having no police power, let alone legislative power, is not empowered to pass an ordinance opening private roads to public traffic. Hence, an ordinance to such effect, duly promulgated by an LGU, is a requisite.

BASCO v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649 (Digested Case)

G.R. No. 91649             May 14, 1991

ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.

Re: Principle of Local Autonomy

FACTS: The PH Amusement and Gaming Corp. was created by PD 1067-A and granted a franchise under PD 1067-B. Subsequently, under PD 1869, the Government enabled it to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under declared policy. But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because of the following issues:

ISSUES:

(1) WON it waived the Manila City gov't's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law.

(2) WON it has intruded into the LGUs' right to impose local taxes and license fees, and thus contrary to the principle of local autonomy enshrined in the Constitution.

(3) WON it violates the equal protection clause as it allows some gambling acts but also prohibits other gaming acts.

(4) WON it violates the Cory  gov't's policy of being away from monopolistic and crony economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization.

HELD:

(1) No. The fact that PAGCOR, under its charter, is exempt from paying tax of any kind is not violative of the principle of local autonomy. LGUs' have no inherent right to impose taxes. LGUs' power to tax must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed by the state itself which has the inherent power to tax. The charter of LGUs is subject to control by Congress as they are mere creatures of Congress. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over LGUs. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions or even take back the power.

(2) No. LGUs' right to impose license fees on "gambling", has long been revoked. As early as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government. Furthermore, LGUs' have no power to tax instrumentalities of the gov't such as PAGCOR which exercises governmental functions of regulating gambling activities.

(3) No.  The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or arbitrary. A law does not have to operate in equal force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution. The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same.

(4) No. The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. On the issue of monopoly, the same is not necessarily prohibited by the Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be "regulated" or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide. The judiciary can only intervene when there are violations of the statutes passed by Congress regulating or prohibiting monopolies.

Read Full Text: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/may1991/gr_91649_1991.html

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