FORTICH v. CORONA, 312 SCRA 751 (Digested Case)

Re: Reclassification of lands thru an ordinance (Sec. 20)

       Finality of decisions

FACTS: The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision of the Office of the President (OP), which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of 44 hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the president has become final and executory, thus barring the validity of the assailed resolution.

HELD: No. When the Office of the President issued the Order declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Thus, the act of the of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

The Historical Juris Doctor Conferment of Mindanao State University College of Law

The Historical Juris Doctor Conferment

Alexander Diamla Dumpa

The Mindanao State University College of Law was the first in the country to confer the Juris Doctor degrees to its graduates following LEB Resolution No. 2019-406. And for this conferment, a very symbolic sablay was specially made.

The Legal Education Board (LEB), created by virtue of Republic Act (RA) 7662 otherwise known as the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, unanimously approved and adopted on the 9^th of January 2019 the aforementioned issuance. Said issuance required all law schools in the country to shift their programs from Bachelor of Laws (LLB) to Juris Doctor (JD). It further resolved that the basic law degrees (whether LLB or JD) earned from law schools recognized or supervised by the LEB and its predecessor regulatory agencies shall be considered as equivalent to doctoral degrees in other non-law academic disciplines for purposes of appointment/employment, ranking and compensation.

The historic Juris Doctor Conferment Ceremony took place on the 6^th of March 2019, with the theme, “MSU Amidst Challenges: Producing Human Resource and Future Leaders in the Legal Profession”, which also coincided with the 38^th Foundation of the College of Law. Indeed, it was a day of total celebration. A day in recognition of the labor, excellence, and commitment of the MSU Law graduates in helping in making the law a pillar of an orderly and more just civil society. A time for celebrating success. And a time for renewing acquaintances and reminiscing the good old days.

With the company of 5 associate justices from the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station, the ceremony was graced by Justice Oscar V. Badelles, an associate justice of the Court of Appeals, as the guest of honor. During his speech, he emphasized how very relevant and timely is the vision of MSU College of Law in producing great lawyers. According to him, the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law creating the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the Marawi Siege, and other challenges that befall our community, usher in a new era full of challenges and great possibilities for the MSU Law graduates to be catalysts of changes in the society.

For the conferment ceremony, a total of 2,040 alumni applied. Out of which, 1,459 alumni were in attendance and 581 alumni were in absentia. A special sablay was also used – the customized sablay with the Juris Doctor, langkit, and the MSU logo printed on it. It also donned the MSU school colors, and with three black strips to signify the doctoral degree equivalency of the Juris Doctor degree. According to Dean Atty. Alizedney M. Ditucalan, LLM, the JD sashes were even more memorable because they were made by the internally displaced persons (IDPs) of Marawi City, and thus this no less symbolizes resilience.

(This article has been published in the MSU Law Gazette, Vol. 3, No. 2, A.Y. 2018-2019).

The Constitutionality of PhiLSAT in Question

The Constitutionality of PhiLSAT in Question

Alexander Diamla Dumpa

The Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) is a standardized national qualifying examination administered by the Legal Educational Board (LEB) to measure the academic potential of a student seeking to study the law, and is generally imposed as a condition sine qua non in entering Philippine law schools on top of the entrance examinations administered by their chosen schools. However, in some schools like the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law, the same can be waived.

First implemented in 1970, PhiLSAT was reintroduced in April 2017 following the creation of the LEB through Republic Act (RA) 7662, otherwise known as the Legal Education Reform Act. For the April 2017 PhiLSAT, a total of 6,575 from the 8,074 examinees passed, representing an 81.43% passing rate. Further, in the same year, law schools, in their discretion, were allowed to accept non-passers, provided that the former submit a justification to the Legal Education Board in accordance with LEB Memorandum No. 7.

In 2018, PhiLSAT became mandatory, which means that no student may be accepted into a law school if they did not pass the same. Further, law schools can still implement their own entrance examinations as a second screening for aspiring law students.

Two groups had filed separate petitions questioning RA 7662 and the LEB issuances imposing PhiLSAT – one group of lawyers, law professors, and students led by retired Makati Regional Trial Court Judge Oscar Pimentel, and another group of students from Visayas who either failed to pass PhiLSAT or failed to take it, before the high court in 2017 and 2018 respectively.

The non-legal grounds concerning practicality submitted by the petitioners and intervenors questioning the constitutionality of PhiLSAT, among others, were the following: (1) PhiLSAT hinders aspiring law students from enrolling in law schools because of the steep exam fee of P1,500 and the limited locations of testing centers; (2) it has low passing rates: the September 2017 PhiLSAT had a passing rate of only 57.76% while the April 2018 and September 2018 exams produced passing rates of 61.39% and 56.78%, respectively; (3) small law schools are also affected by the qualifying exam requirement because with fewer students, schools are either forced to increase tuition or close shop. On the other hand, their legal grounds raised issues, among others, on: (1) the academic freedom of academic institutions; (2) the right to know of the people; and (3) the separation of powers.

According to Justice Marvic Leonen, PhiLSAT might possibly be unconstitutional not because of the administering authority but because of violation of academic freedom, a position taken by amicus curiae (friend of the court) Dean Sedfrey Candelaria. Academic freedom pertains to the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall teach, and who may be admitted to study. The same is provided under Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. (2). Academic Freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning

Law schools, therefore, should be the one to administer their own qualifying exams as part of their constitutionally-guaranteed academic freedom, which includes the power to determine who may be admitted to study, and not by any other body. The state cannot prevent schools from admitting students on their discretion. Law schools have the right to admit even non-passers of PhiLSAT as they must not be homogenized to the point that all of them become Bar review centers rather than legal academics. Doing otherwise is already dictatorial. Besides, according to petitioners, what is the interest of the state in interfering with what is essentially a contract between a student and a school (in the case of private law schools) by imposing a qualifying exam?

It was even argued that “some want to study, not necessarily to become lawyers,” a sentiment also shared by Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio. It was contended that LEB cannot prevent a person from trying to get as much knowledge as he can. The State should not be able to filter out applicants to law schools because it violates people’s right to know, particularly those who just want to study law but do not necessarily want to become lawyers. Hence, PhiLSAT is violative of the right of the people to know as provided under Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. (3). Every Citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.

For want of scientific study to back up the claim that imposing a qualifying exam will help improve the quality of legal education, it was contended that PhiLSAT is unreasonable and therefore, LEB gravely abused its discretion in promulgating and administering the same. LEB chairperson Emerson Aquende admitted that they did not have any study but relied on the results of the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) in the United States of America.

As to the issue on separation of powers, petitioners argued that PhiLSAT encroaches upon the Supreme Court’s constitutional power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law because it imposed an additional requirement for the practice of law – a qualifying exam for law schools – and is administered by a body not answerable to the SC. The LEB being attached to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) only for budgetary and administrative purposes and is independent from the SC. Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC shall have the power, among others, over:

Section 5. (5). x x x admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged x x x

Hence, Admission to legal education is part of the practice of law and should thus solely be under the jurisdiction of the high court. Thus, any entrance examination for law school must be administered by the high tribunal and not by a body created by Congress. Congress cannot tell the SC how it is going to admit people to the Bar. Congress cannot create an administrative office or board that can exercise the power vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General in the person of Jose Calida, representing the LEB, said that admission to law schools is different from admission to the practice of law. Thus, the same does not violate the rule on separation of powers. Some justices also pointed out that the high tribunal had never regulated law schools in the past and only required that law graduates take up a minimum number of courses to qualify for the Bar Exams.

Civil Law Dean Nilo Divina expressed support for the LEB, saying that the office provided a more efficient admissions examination for aspiring law students. Not all law schools conduct their own admission test so that is the idea itself. It is the nationwide examination to determine who are fit to law schools.

Dean Ranhilio Aquino, on the other hand, believes that if one is to follow the belief that PhiLSAT curtails the people’s right to knowledge, the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) – requirement for admission to Philippine medical schools, should be declared unconstitutional as well.

The researcher herein conducted an informal random survey, asking students from MSU College of Law regarding this matter. The result showed that 58.33% students were in favor of removing PhiLSAT as a condition sine qua non for admission to law school. According to some of them, the same is not an effective instrument in determining whether a student can survive law school and thus pass the BAR exam; it is not necessary since the exam itself is not actually related to what students should expect in the study of the law; it does not give equal opportunities to aspiring students; it is tedious; and finally, while indeed admission to the practice of law is a privilege, admission to the study of law is a right. On the other hand, 41.67% of the respondents said that PhiLSAT should be maintained. For some of them, it was claimed that PhiLSAT filters students who want to enter law schools; it is necessary to maintain the high standards of the study of law; it helps in raising the passing rates of law schools; and finally, it determines who are fit and it eliminates the unfit.

As of today, April 2019, pursuant to the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court in March 2019, admission requirements are to be determined by respective law schools while case is pending.

(This article has been published in the MSU Law Gazette, Vol. 3, No. 2, A.Y. 2018-2019).

ROXAS AND CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999 (Digested Case)

Re: Reclassification of lands thru an ordinance (Sec. 20, LGC 1991)

FACTS: The petitioner's claim that the three haciendas involved are not subject to agrarian reform because they have been declared for tourism, not agricultural purposes. In 1975, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 declaring the municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas a tourist zone. Lands in Nasugbu, including the subject haciendas, were allegedly reclassified as non-agricultural 13 years before the effectivity of R. A. No. 6657 (CARL). In 1993, the Regional Director for Region IV of the DA certified that the haciendas are not feasible and sound for agricultural development. On March 20, 1992, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas adopted Resolution No. 19 reclassifying certain areas of Nasugbu as non-agricultural. This Resolution approved Municipal Ordinance No. 19, Series of 1992, the Revised Zoning Ordinance of Nasugbu which zoning ordinance was based on a Land Use Plan for Planning Areas for New Development allegedly prepared by the University of the Philippines. Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 8, 1993. Petitioner claims that proclamation No. 1520 was also upheld by respondent DAR in 1991 when it approved conversion of 1,827 hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area known as the Batulao Resort Complex, and 13.52 hectares in Barangay Caylaway as within the potential tourist belt. Petitioner present evidence before us that these areas are adjacent to the haciendas subject of this petition, hence, the haciendas should likewise be converted. Petitioner urges this Court to take cognizance of the conversion proceedings and rule accordingly.

ISSUE: WON the application for conversion of land from agricultural to non-agricultural is under the exclusive juridisction of DAR.

HELD: Yes. Respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner's landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner's application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR. The DAR's mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4 (j) and Section 5 (l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President. Said laws vest in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve or disapprove "individual" applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses.

NB: LGU need not obtain DAR's approval to expropriate agricultural lands (Camarines v. CA).

PLAZA II v. CASSION, 435 SCRA 294 (Digested Case)

PLAZA II v. CASSION

Re: Devolution (Sec. 17 & 24, LGC 1991)

FACTS: Upon the implementation of the LGC, some functions of agencies, like that of the DSWD, were devolved to LGUs. The City Council of Butuan passed a resolution authorizing its mayor to sign an MOA for the devolution of the DSWD to the city. Pursuant to said MOA, the services, personnel. assets and liabilities and technical support systems of DSWD were transferred to its city counterpart. By virtue of the same MOA, the mayor issued an EO, reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 national DSWD employees headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon who was also designated as OIC of CSSDO. The CSSDO was originally composed of herein respondents, headed by Carolina M. Cassion. Aggrieved by such development, they refused to recognize petitioner Tuazon as their new head and to report at the DSWD building. They contended that the issuance of the reconstituting EOby Mayor Plaza and the designation of petitioner Tuazon as Officer-in-charge of the CSSDO are illegal. Despite Mayor Plazas series of orders to respondents to report for work at the DSWD building, they failed to do so. Because of this, Mayor Plaza issued an order dropping respondents from the rolls pursuant to the CSC Memorandum Circular.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the dropping of respondents from the roll is legal.

(2) WON respondents were denied due process for lack of notice and hearing.

(3) WON  the contention of respondents that it was really the intention of the mayor to systematically remove them was meritorious.

(4) WON the EO was valid.

(5) WON respondents' right to security of tenure has been violated as they were transferred without their consent.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The CSC Memorandum Circular provides that, "officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) and may be dropped from the service without prior notice."

(2)  No. The separation of an employee who is dropped from the rolls is a non-disciplinary action wherein the respondent is entitled to notice and hearing. In the above-quoted provision, an officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls if he was continuously absent without official leave for a period of at least thirty days. Prior notice is not necessary.

(3) No. No evidence was submitted by the appellants to support such contention.

(4) Yes. Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets and liabilities, records of basic services, and facilities of a national government agency to local government units. Under this Code, the term devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. Furthemore,  devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer. It is thus clear that Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue the EO in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the LGC. As the local chief executive, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head, as was done by the Mayor here. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1992, provides further that heads of departments appointed by the local chief executive must have the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanggunian concerned. While initially, the Sanggunian rejected petitioner Tuazons appointment as the City Government Department Head II of the CSSDO, however, it later confirmed her appointment.

(5) No. There was no such transfer. Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service and may be imposed as an administrative penalty. The change of respondents place of work from the original CSSDO office to the DSWD building is not a transfer. It was only a physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service. There were no new movements or appointments from one position to another.

BINAY v. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991 (Digested Case)

BINAY v. DOMINGO

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: The Municipality of Makati passed a resolution extending financial assistance to a bereaved family whose gross income does not exceed P2000  a month. The resolution was referred to respondent COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA disapproved the resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. COA's objection is of the position that there is no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under the resolution and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc., of the inhabitants of Makati. COA's also argued that. "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case."

ISSUES:

(1) WON the resolution of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

(2) WON the classification of pauper beneficiaries is violative of  the equal protection clause in the constitution.

HELD:

(1) Yes. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

(2) No. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

SOLICITOR GENERAL v. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (MMA), 204 SCRA 837 (Digested Case)

SOLICITOR GENERAL v. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (MMA)

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: In the Gonong Case 1990, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. In the case at bar, the MMA issued an ordinance authorizing itself to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. On the other hand, private petitioners herein contended that the ordinance passed by MMA and the provisions of the decision in the Gonong Case were conflicting. The MMA argued that there was no conflict between the two. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why the ordinance was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the ordinance cannot be attacked collaterally.

(2) WON there was valid delegation of legislative power to MMA.

(3) WON the ordinance of MMA is valid.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.

(2) Yes. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

(3) No. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanction. MMA and LGUs are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.