TATEL v. MUNICIPALTIY OF VIRAC, 207 SCRA 837 (Digested Case)

TATEL v. MUNICIPALTIY OF VIRAC

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: On the basis of complaints received from the residents, against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed, declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Ordinance No. 13 is valid.

(2) WON the appelate court erred in giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses.

(3) WON the appelate court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous establishments similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but which are not prosecuted.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The ordinance was passed by the municipal council in exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the LGC.

(2) No. The ambiguity therein therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government.

(3) No. As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.

TANO v. SOCRATES, 278 SCRA 154 (Digested Case)

TANO v. SOCRATES

Re: General principles (Sec. 1-5, LGC1991)

FACTS: The City Council of Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City for 5 years. In the same light, the Provincial Council of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling, and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating said ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit; and that the Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways

ISSUES: WON the assailed ordinances and resolution are valid.

HELD: Yes. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance. Further, one of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.[30] This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES, 234 SCRA 255 (Digested Case)

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES

Re: General principles (Sec. 1-5, LGC 1991)

FACTS: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. It enacted ordinances which both prohibit the issuance of business permit and cancel existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino, and impose penalty thereto. The petitioners argue that LGUs may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: WON LGUs are empowered to enact ordinances prohibiting the operation of PAGCOR within the formers' jurisdiction.

HELD: No. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress "only" those forms of "gambling prohibited" by law. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

EVARDONE v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464 (Digested Case)

EVARDONE v. COMELEC

Re: General principles (Sec. 1-5, LGC 1991)

FACTS: Petitioner Evardone is the mayor of Municipality of Sulat. Herein respondents filed a petition for recall with the Office of the Local Election Registrar (LER) in said municipality against said mayor. The respondent COMELEC issued a resolution, approving the recommendation of the LER, to hold the signing of the petition for recall. On July 10, 1990, Evardone prayed for a TRO which was favorably issued on July 12, 1990. On the same day, July 12, the TRO was received by the central office of COMELEC. But it was only in July 15 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of the signing process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO. Thereafter, the respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court. The COMELEC held that the critical date to consider is the service or notice of the Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the Commission on Election, and not upon its agent in the field. Evardone however argued that the resolution earlier issued by respondent is null and void as he maintained that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the adoption of the 1987 Constitution abrogated the provisions of BP 337, and therefore, COMELEC indeed has no basis in conducting the recall.

(2) WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant to the questioned resolution.

HELD:

(1)  No. Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. RA 7160 providing for the LGC 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals BP 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the LGC 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old LGC (BP 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new LGC, the effectiveness of BP 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.  Thus, the COMELEC was vested the power to promulgate the questioned resolution.

(2) No. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the respondent COMELEC and Apelado, et al. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary, there is no turning back the clock. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect. However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states: (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official's assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

NB: Petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

MALABANG v. BENITO, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969 (Digested Case)

Re: De facto municipal corporation

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of EO 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, which created the Municipality of Balabagan out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. Petitioner relied on the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General while respondent contended that  that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.

WON:

(1) WON the controverted matter may be attacked collateraly.

(2) WON EO 386 is constitutional.

HELD:

(1) Yes. It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporations. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.

(2) No. In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other "valid law" giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is "no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation".

Juanito Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995 (Digested Case)

Re: Based on verifiable indicators of viability/projected capacity

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the Municipality of Makati to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. Petitioners contend that the special law did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction of Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials; that it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law; that the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with the population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and the LGC.

HELD:

(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials.

(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census.

(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill.

(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.

HELD:

(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The court take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary dispute.

(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.

(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.

LOPEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-56022, May 31, 1985 (Digested Case)

LOPEZ v. COMELEC (1985)

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: After a referedum in 1975 wherein residents of the Greater Manila area authorized the  President to restructure the local governments of the four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of government, PD 824 was issued by the President creating a public corporation to be known as the Metropolitan Manila vested with the powers and attributes of a corporation. Petitioners herein assailed the constitutionality of PD 824 relying on the provision of the LGC (enacted in 1983): "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected".

ISSUES:

(1) WON PD 824 is unconstitutional.

(2) WON PD 824 violated the equal protection clause of the constitution.

HELD:

(1) No. The doubt on the creation of PD 824 has been removed by the present Constitutional provision and in the Article on Batasang Pambansa that both recognized the existence of the Metropolitan Manila. Furthermore, the plebiscite conducted in 1975 manifested the will of the residence of the area which thus satisfied the provision relied upon by petitioners. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.

(2) No. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. It is clear that under the equal protection clause, classification is not forbidden. As was so well put by Justice Laurel as ponente in the leading case People v. Vera: "Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted." Here, PD 824 has complied with the requirements of valid classification.

*Nota Bene: The president may only excercise general supervision over Metropolitan Manila, contrary to what was previously stipulated therein granting the president the power to control it.