Quezon City v. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GR No. 166408 (Digested)

FACTS: Congress enacted RA 7966 in 1995, subsequent to the effectivity of the Local Government Code in 1992. Under it, respondent herein was granted the franchise to install and operate radio and television broadcasting stations. Likewise, section 8 thereof imposed on respondent the duty of paying 3% franchise tax, “in lieu of all taxes”. In view of said provision, respondent is of the opinion that that it is not liable to pay the local franchise tax imposed by petitioner local government unit in relation to the Local Government Code.

ISSUES:

(1)    Whether the “in lieu of all taxes” provision in RA 7966 exempt respondent from payment of local franchise tax.

(2)    Whether Congress can grant exemptions from local taxes imposed by local government units.

HELD:

(1)    No. Statutes granting tax exemptions are strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing authority. Here, the law failed to specify the taxing authority from whose jurisdiction the taxing power is withheld. In fine, respondent failed to justify its claim for exemption, by a grant “too plain to be mistaken”. Its claim for exemption from the local franchise tax must fail.

(2)    Yes. The grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and the Local Government Code does not affect the inherent power of Congress to grant exemptions.

IS DEMOCRACY SINE QUA NON TO HUMAN RIGHTS?

IS DEMOCRACY SINE QUA NON TO HUMAN RIGHTS?

Researcher: Alexander Diamla Dumpa

Since then, there has been a question on whether or not, the full range of human rights can only be respected and observed in a democratic government. Some argue that such rights are often violated in other forms of government. While some contend otherwise. Nevertheless, status quo shows that this question remains unanswered.

 

Photo not owned by the blogger herein.

Perhaps almost everyone will agree that human rights are rights that protect our personhood as human beings, and that human rights are characterized by autonomy and liberty. Since it is understood that autonomy is self-legislation and choosing one’s own conception of a worthwhile life, and that liberty is being free to pursue that conception, does it mean, therefore, that one has a right to a fair say in decisions that crucially affect him? And as a citizen or subject of a state, do not most decisions of government affect him? If so, does this mean that a government that does not allow its citizens or subjects to exercise such a right to a fair say in government decision does not respect the latter’s autonomy and liberty? Evidently, only a democratic government ensures such right of fair say, which therefore means respecting one’s autonomy and liberty. If so, is it safe to say then that democracy is indeed sine qua non in the observance of human rights?

In answering the question, the degree of coverage of autonomy and liberty must be considered as well as certain circumstances. History shows that most non-democratic governments are more likely to violate human rights especially in oligarchy and plutocracy. But is this absolute in non-democratic governments? One might argue that, “what about a modern aristocracy of talents, composed of the best judges, philosophers, economists, and public servants that a society has?” Although we are now thinking of a citizenry educated and cohesive enough to be able to form a democracy, still, people may be deprived of what they need and what they want because people do not decide for themselves. But if we say on the other hand, that democracy is better then, in terms of human rights observance, does this mean that it is absolute? No. because even a democratic government, which has proven benevolence and competence, does not automatically and necessarily assure people’s liberty.

Therefore, the answer to the question on whether or not democracy is sine qua non to human rights is: maybe yes and no, depending upon circumstances. But the question on what type of government protects human rights more effectively can be answered with certainty. If we compare which type of government respects human rights more, a government that is run by, of, and for the people is more likely to protect the same, and that is a democratic government. The United Nations thinks so too. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) provides that:

“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen representatives…The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures.”

In conclusion, based on research and existing data, the link between democracy and human rights appears to be interdependent, intricate, mutually supportive and symbiotic. In fact, when we define what democracy is, we unconsciously or consciously often use features of human rights to describe the same. A functional democracy that accommodates diversity, promotes equality and protects individual freedoms is increasingly becoming more ideal against the concentration of power in the hands of a few and the abuse of human rights that inevitably results from it. History tells us that when power is given to one person or group of people, abuses, chaos, and tyranny are expected to occur. Evidently, the greatest protection of human rights, therefore, emanates from a sustainable democratic framework grounded in the rule of law.

(This article has been published in the MSU Law Gazette, Vol. 3, No. 1, A.Y. 2017-2018).

Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Berciles (Digested Case)

Re: Closure and opening of roads thru an ordinance (Sec. 21)

FACTS: This is a petition for review of an order dismissing petitioner's application for registration of title over a parcel of land. The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. The City Council of Cebu, through a resolution, declared the terminal portion of said street abandoned road. Subsequently, the City Council of Cebu passed another resolution, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public bidding. Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner. The City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner. The petitioner filed an application with the Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered. However, the Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss the application on the ground that the property sought to be registered being a public road intended for public use is considered part of the public domain and therefore outside the commerce of man. Consequently, it cannot be subject to registration by any private individual.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the City Charter of Cebu City (RA 3857) give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned.

(2) WON the declaration of the road, as abandoned, make it the patrimonial property of the City of Cebu which may be the object of a common contract.

(3) WON the property in question is registrable by the petitioner.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The pertinent portions of the Revised Charter of Cebu City provides that the city council has the authority "to close any city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or conveyed." From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a city road or street.

(2) Yes. Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that "Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." Since that portion of the city street subject of petitioner's application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the object of an ordinary contract.

(3) Yes.  Since the withdrawal of the property in question from public use and its subsequent sale to the petitioner is valid. Hence, the petitioner has a registerable title over the lot in question.

Cabrera v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 314 (Digested Case)

Re: Closure and opening of roads thru an ordinance (Sec. 21)

FACTS: The Provincial Board of Catanduanes adopted Resolution to close the old road leading to the new Capitol Building of their province and to give to the owners of the properties traversed by the new road equal area as per survey by the Highway District Engineer's office from the old road adjacent to the respective remaining portion of their properties. Pursuant to a deed of exchange authorized by the Provincial Governor of Catanduanes, the exchange of properties took place. Herein petitioner, filed a petition for "Restoration of Public Road and/or Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages." He alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province of Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He contended that Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was the closure of the northern portion of the said road. The CA held that pursuant to Republic Act No. 5185, municipal authorities can close, subject to the approval or direction of the Provincial Board, thoroughfares under Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code. Although in this case the road was not closed by the municipality of Catanduanes but by the provincial board of Catanduanes, the closure, nevertheless, is valid since it was ordered by the approving authority itself. However, while it could do so, the provincial government of Catanduanes could close the road only if the persons prejudiced thereby were indemnified, Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code being very explicit on this. Before us now, the petitioner insists that Sec. 2246 is not applicable because the resolution is not an order for the closure of the road in question but an authority to barter or exchange it with private properties. He maintains that the public road was owned by the province in its governmental capacity and, without a prior order of closure, could not be the subject of a barter. Control over public roads, he insists, is with Congress and not with the provincial board

ISSUES: 

(1) WON the resolution is valid. 

(2) WON the municipal, and not the provincial board has the authority to issue such resolution.

(3) WON the petitioner has sustained injuries and therefore should be indemnified.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The authority of the provincial board to close that road and use or convey it for other purposes is derived from the provisions of RA 5185 in relation to Section 2246 of the Revised Administrative Code. Property thus withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose for which other real property belonging to the municipality might be lawfully used or conveyed. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

(2) No. There is no reason for not applying the doctrine announced in Favis to the provincial board in connection with the closure of provincial roads. The provincial board has, after all, the duty of maintaining such roads for the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants of the province. Moreover, this authority is inferable from the grant by the national legislature of the funds to the Province of Catanduanes for the construction of provincial roads.

(3) No. The general rule is that one whose property does not abut on the closed section of a street has no right to compensation for the closing or vacation of the street, if he still has reasonable access to the general system of streets. The circumstances in some cases may be such as to give a right to damages to a property owner, even though his property does not abut on the closed section. But to warrant recovery in any such case the property owner must show that the situation is such that he has sustained special damages differing in kind, and not merely in degree, from those sustained by the public generally. Here, the petitioners failed to adduce evidence that he indeed sustained injuries. (Damnum absque injuria)

Dacanay v. Asistio, 208 SCRA 404 (Digested Case)

Re: Closure and opening of roads thru an ordinance (Sec. 21)

FACTS: Metropolitan Manila Commission, enacted an ordinance designating certain city and municipal streets, roads and open spaces as sites for flea markets. Pursuant, thereto, the Caloocan City mayor opened up seven (7) flea markets in that city. Upon application of vendors,  the respondents city mayor and city engineer, issued them licenses to conduct vending activities on said street. In 1987, Antonio Martinez, as OIC city mayor of Caloocan City, caused the demolition of the market stalls on affected areas. To stop Martinez from clearing the sreets, stallowners filed an action for prohibition. However, shortly after the decision came out in favor of the OIC mayor, the city administration in Caloocan City changed hands. City Mayor Macario Asistio, Jr., as successor of Mayor Martinez, did not pursue the latter's policy of clearing and cleaning up the city streets. Dacanay filed the present petition for mandamus, praying that the public respondents be ordered to enforce the final decision which upheld the city mayor's authority to order the demolition of market stalls on affected streets and to enforce P.D. No. 772 and other pertinent laws.

ISSUES: WON public dominions may be leased or be subjects to contracts.

HELD: No. There is no doubt that the disputed areas from which the private respondents' market stalls are sought to be evicted are public streets, as found by the trial court in Civil Case No. C-12921. A public street is property for public use hence outside the commerce of man (Arts. 420, 424, Civil Code). Being outside the commerce of man, it may not be the subject of lease or other contract (Villanueva et al. vs. Castañeda and Macalino, 15 SCRA 142, citing the Municipality of Cavite vs. Rojas, 30 SCRA 602; Espiritu vs. Municipal Council of Pozorrubio, 102 Phil. 869; and Muyot vs. De la Fuente, 48 O.G. 4860). As the stallholders pay fees to the City Government for the right to occupy portions of the public street, the City Government, contrary to law, has been leasing portions of the streets to them. Such leases or licenses are null and void for being contrary to law. The right of the public to use the city streets may not be bargained away through contract. The interests of a few should not prevail over the good of the greater number in the community whose health, peace, safety, good order and general welfare, the respondent city officials are under legal obligation to protect.

New Sun Valley v. Sangguniang Barangay, G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011 (Digested Case)

Re: Closure and opening of roads thru an ordinance (Sec. 21)

FACTS: The Sangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley issued a Resolution directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallow and Aster Streets to vehicular and pedestrian traffic. NSV residents, contended that when they bought their residential properties, they also paid proportionately for the roads and the park in then subdivision. They have therefore an existing equity on these roads. To open the roads to public use is a violation of the rights and interests to a secure, peaceful and healthful environment. Further, they claimed that a "Barangay Resolution" cannot validly cause the opening of the subject roads because under the law, an "ordinance" is required to effect such an act.

ISSUE: WON the claim of NSV that a "Barangay Resolution" cannot validly cause the opening of the subject roads because under the law, an "ordinance" is required to effect such an act, is correct.

HELD: No. NSV is incorrect. The requirement under Sec. 21 of the passage of an ordinance by a local government unit to effect the opening of a local road, can have no applicability to the instant case since the subdivision road lots sought to be opened to decongest traffic in the area - namely Rosemallow and Aster Streets – have already been donated by the Sun Valley Subdivision to, and the titles thereto already issued in the name of, the City Government of Parañaque since the year 1964. Having been already donated or turned over to the City Government of Parañaque, the road lots in question have since then taken the nature of public roads which are withdrawn from the commerce of man, and hence placed beyond the private rights or claims of herein Appellant. Accordingly, NSV was not in the lawful exercise of its predicated rights when it built obstructing structures closing the road lots in question to vehicular traffic for the use of the general Public. Consequently, defendant’s act of passing the disputed barangay resolution, the implementation of which is sought to be restrained by Appellant, had for its purpose not the opening of a private road but may be considered merely as a directive or reminder to the Appellant to cause the opening of a public road which should rightfully be open for use to the general public.

FORTICH v. CORONA, 312 SCRA 751 (Digested Case)

Re: Reclassification of lands thru an ordinance (Sec. 20)

       Finality of decisions

FACTS: The strikers protested the March 29, 1996 Decision of the Office of the President (OP), which approved the conversion of a 144-hectare land from agricultural to agro-industrial/institutional area. This led the Office of the President to issue the so-called "Win-Win" Resolution, substantially modifying its earlier Decision after it had already become final and executory. The said Resolution modified the approval of the land conversion to agro-industrial area only to the extent of 44 hectares, and ordered the remaining 100 hectares to be distributed to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.

ISSUE: WON the decision of the president has become final and executory, thus barring the validity of the assailed resolution.

HELD: No. When the Office of the President issued the Order declaring the Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution. Thus, the act of the of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996 Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.

The Historical Juris Doctor Conferment of Mindanao State University College of Law

The Historical Juris Doctor Conferment

Alexander Diamla Dumpa

The Mindanao State University College of Law was the first in the country to confer the Juris Doctor degrees to its graduates following LEB Resolution No. 2019-406. And for this conferment, a very symbolic sablay was specially made.

The Legal Education Board (LEB), created by virtue of Republic Act (RA) 7662 otherwise known as the Legal Education Reform Act of 1993, unanimously approved and adopted on the 9^th of January 2019 the aforementioned issuance. Said issuance required all law schools in the country to shift their programs from Bachelor of Laws (LLB) to Juris Doctor (JD). It further resolved that the basic law degrees (whether LLB or JD) earned from law schools recognized or supervised by the LEB and its predecessor regulatory agencies shall be considered as equivalent to doctoral degrees in other non-law academic disciplines for purposes of appointment/employment, ranking and compensation.

The historic Juris Doctor Conferment Ceremony took place on the 6^th of March 2019, with the theme, “MSU Amidst Challenges: Producing Human Resource and Future Leaders in the Legal Profession”, which also coincided with the 38^th Foundation of the College of Law. Indeed, it was a day of total celebration. A day in recognition of the labor, excellence, and commitment of the MSU Law graduates in helping in making the law a pillar of an orderly and more just civil society. A time for celebrating success. And a time for renewing acquaintances and reminiscing the good old days.

With the company of 5 associate justices from the Court of Appeals Mindanao Station, the ceremony was graced by Justice Oscar V. Badelles, an associate justice of the Court of Appeals, as the guest of honor. During his speech, he emphasized how very relevant and timely is the vision of MSU College of Law in producing great lawyers. According to him, the ratification of the Bangsamoro Organic Law creating the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, the Marawi Siege, and other challenges that befall our community, usher in a new era full of challenges and great possibilities for the MSU Law graduates to be catalysts of changes in the society.

For the conferment ceremony, a total of 2,040 alumni applied. Out of which, 1,459 alumni were in attendance and 581 alumni were in absentia. A special sablay was also used – the customized sablay with the Juris Doctor, langkit, and the MSU logo printed on it. It also donned the MSU school colors, and with three black strips to signify the doctoral degree equivalency of the Juris Doctor degree. According to Dean Atty. Alizedney M. Ditucalan, LLM, the JD sashes were even more memorable because they were made by the internally displaced persons (IDPs) of Marawi City, and thus this no less symbolizes resilience.

(This article has been published in the MSU Law Gazette, Vol. 3, No. 2, A.Y. 2018-2019).

The Constitutionality of PhiLSAT in Question

The Constitutionality of PhiLSAT in Question

Alexander Diamla Dumpa

The Philippine Law School Admission Test (PhiLSAT) is a standardized national qualifying examination administered by the Legal Educational Board (LEB) to measure the academic potential of a student seeking to study the law, and is generally imposed as a condition sine qua non in entering Philippine law schools on top of the entrance examinations administered by their chosen schools. However, in some schools like the University of the Philippines (UP) College of Law, the same can be waived.

First implemented in 1970, PhiLSAT was reintroduced in April 2017 following the creation of the LEB through Republic Act (RA) 7662, otherwise known as the Legal Education Reform Act. For the April 2017 PhiLSAT, a total of 6,575 from the 8,074 examinees passed, representing an 81.43% passing rate. Further, in the same year, law schools, in their discretion, were allowed to accept non-passers, provided that the former submit a justification to the Legal Education Board in accordance with LEB Memorandum No. 7.

In 2018, PhiLSAT became mandatory, which means that no student may be accepted into a law school if they did not pass the same. Further, law schools can still implement their own entrance examinations as a second screening for aspiring law students.

Two groups had filed separate petitions questioning RA 7662 and the LEB issuances imposing PhiLSAT – one group of lawyers, law professors, and students led by retired Makati Regional Trial Court Judge Oscar Pimentel, and another group of students from Visayas who either failed to pass PhiLSAT or failed to take it, before the high court in 2017 and 2018 respectively.

The non-legal grounds concerning practicality submitted by the petitioners and intervenors questioning the constitutionality of PhiLSAT, among others, were the following: (1) PhiLSAT hinders aspiring law students from enrolling in law schools because of the steep exam fee of P1,500 and the limited locations of testing centers; (2) it has low passing rates: the September 2017 PhiLSAT had a passing rate of only 57.76% while the April 2018 and September 2018 exams produced passing rates of 61.39% and 56.78%, respectively; (3) small law schools are also affected by the qualifying exam requirement because with fewer students, schools are either forced to increase tuition or close shop. On the other hand, their legal grounds raised issues, among others, on: (1) the academic freedom of academic institutions; (2) the right to know of the people; and (3) the separation of powers.

According to Justice Marvic Leonen, PhiLSAT might possibly be unconstitutional not because of the administering authority but because of violation of academic freedom, a position taken by amicus curiae (friend of the court) Dean Sedfrey Candelaria. Academic freedom pertains to the independence of an academic institution to determine for itself who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall teach, and who may be admitted to study. The same is provided under Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. (2). Academic Freedom shall be enjoyed in all institutions of higher learning

Law schools, therefore, should be the one to administer their own qualifying exams as part of their constitutionally-guaranteed academic freedom, which includes the power to determine who may be admitted to study, and not by any other body. The state cannot prevent schools from admitting students on their discretion. Law schools have the right to admit even non-passers of PhiLSAT as they must not be homogenized to the point that all of them become Bar review centers rather than legal academics. Doing otherwise is already dictatorial. Besides, according to petitioners, what is the interest of the state in interfering with what is essentially a contract between a student and a school (in the case of private law schools) by imposing a qualifying exam?

It was even argued that “some want to study, not necessarily to become lawyers,” a sentiment also shared by Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio. It was contended that LEB cannot prevent a person from trying to get as much knowledge as he can. The State should not be able to filter out applicants to law schools because it violates people’s right to know, particularly those who just want to study law but do not necessarily want to become lawyers. Hence, PhiLSAT is violative of the right of the people to know as provided under Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution:

Section 5. (3). Every Citizen has a right to select a profession or course of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements.

For want of scientific study to back up the claim that imposing a qualifying exam will help improve the quality of legal education, it was contended that PhiLSAT is unreasonable and therefore, LEB gravely abused its discretion in promulgating and administering the same. LEB chairperson Emerson Aquende admitted that they did not have any study but relied on the results of the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) in the United States of America.

As to the issue on separation of powers, petitioners argued that PhiLSAT encroaches upon the Supreme Court’s constitutional power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice of law because it imposed an additional requirement for the practice of law – a qualifying exam for law schools – and is administered by a body not answerable to the SC. The LEB being attached to the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) only for budgetary and administrative purposes and is independent from the SC. Article VIII of the Constitution states that the SC shall have the power, among others, over:

Section 5. (5). x x x admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged x x x

Hence, Admission to legal education is part of the practice of law and should thus solely be under the jurisdiction of the high court. Thus, any entrance examination for law school must be administered by the high tribunal and not by a body created by Congress. Congress cannot tell the SC how it is going to admit people to the Bar. Congress cannot create an administrative office or board that can exercise the power vested in the Supreme Court by the Constitution.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General in the person of Jose Calida, representing the LEB, said that admission to law schools is different from admission to the practice of law. Thus, the same does not violate the rule on separation of powers. Some justices also pointed out that the high tribunal had never regulated law schools in the past and only required that law graduates take up a minimum number of courses to qualify for the Bar Exams.

Civil Law Dean Nilo Divina expressed support for the LEB, saying that the office provided a more efficient admissions examination for aspiring law students. Not all law schools conduct their own admission test so that is the idea itself. It is the nationwide examination to determine who are fit to law schools.

Dean Ranhilio Aquino, on the other hand, believes that if one is to follow the belief that PhiLSAT curtails the people’s right to knowledge, the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) – requirement for admission to Philippine medical schools, should be declared unconstitutional as well.

The researcher herein conducted an informal random survey, asking students from MSU College of Law regarding this matter. The result showed that 58.33% students were in favor of removing PhiLSAT as a condition sine qua non for admission to law school. According to some of them, the same is not an effective instrument in determining whether a student can survive law school and thus pass the BAR exam; it is not necessary since the exam itself is not actually related to what students should expect in the study of the law; it does not give equal opportunities to aspiring students; it is tedious; and finally, while indeed admission to the practice of law is a privilege, admission to the study of law is a right. On the other hand, 41.67% of the respondents said that PhiLSAT should be maintained. For some of them, it was claimed that PhiLSAT filters students who want to enter law schools; it is necessary to maintain the high standards of the study of law; it helps in raising the passing rates of law schools; and finally, it determines who are fit and it eliminates the unfit.

As of today, April 2019, pursuant to the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Supreme Court in March 2019, admission requirements are to be determined by respective law schools while case is pending.

(This article has been published in the MSU Law Gazette, Vol. 3, No. 2, A.Y. 2018-2019).

ROXAS AND CO., INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 127876, December 17, 1999 (Digested Case)

Re: Reclassification of lands thru an ordinance (Sec. 20, LGC 1991)

FACTS: The petitioner's claim that the three haciendas involved are not subject to agrarian reform because they have been declared for tourism, not agricultural purposes. In 1975, then President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1520 declaring the municipality of Nasugbu, Batangas a tourist zone. Lands in Nasugbu, including the subject haciendas, were allegedly reclassified as non-agricultural 13 years before the effectivity of R. A. No. 6657 (CARL). In 1993, the Regional Director for Region IV of the DA certified that the haciendas are not feasible and sound for agricultural development. On March 20, 1992, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1520, the Sangguniang Bayan of Nasugbu, Batangas adopted Resolution No. 19 reclassifying certain areas of Nasugbu as non-agricultural. This Resolution approved Municipal Ordinance No. 19, Series of 1992, the Revised Zoning Ordinance of Nasugbu which zoning ordinance was based on a Land Use Plan for Planning Areas for New Development allegedly prepared by the University of the Philippines. Resolution No. 19 of the Sangguniang Bayan was approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Batangas on March 8, 1993. Petitioner claims that proclamation No. 1520 was also upheld by respondent DAR in 1991 when it approved conversion of 1,827 hectares in Nasugbu into a tourist area known as the Batulao Resort Complex, and 13.52 hectares in Barangay Caylaway as within the potential tourist belt. Petitioner present evidence before us that these areas are adjacent to the haciendas subject of this petition, hence, the haciendas should likewise be converted. Petitioner urges this Court to take cognizance of the conversion proceedings and rule accordingly.

ISSUE: WON the application for conversion of land from agricultural to non-agricultural is under the exclusive juridisction of DAR.

HELD: Yes. Respondent DAR's failure to observe due process in the acquisition of petitioner's landholdings does not ipso facto give this Court the power to adjudicate over petitioner's application for conversion of its haciendas from agricultural to non-agricultural. The agency charged with the mandate of approving or disapproving applications for conversion is the DAR. The DAR's mandate over applications for conversion was first laid down in Section 4 (j) and Section 5 (l) of Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987 and reiterated in the CARL and Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the President. Said laws vest in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve or disapprove "individual" applications for conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial and other land uses.

NB: LGU need not obtain DAR's approval to expropriate agricultural lands (Camarines v. CA).

PLAZA II v. CASSION, 435 SCRA 294 (Digested Case)

PLAZA II v. CASSION

Re: Devolution (Sec. 17 & 24, LGC 1991)

FACTS: Upon the implementation of the LGC, some functions of agencies, like that of the DSWD, were devolved to LGUs. The City Council of Butuan passed a resolution authorizing its mayor to sign an MOA for the devolution of the DSWD to the city. Pursuant to said MOA, the services, personnel. assets and liabilities and technical support systems of DSWD were transferred to its city counterpart. By virtue of the same MOA, the mayor issued an EO, reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding thereto 19 national DSWD employees headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon who was also designated as OIC of CSSDO. The CSSDO was originally composed of herein respondents, headed by Carolina M. Cassion. Aggrieved by such development, they refused to recognize petitioner Tuazon as their new head and to report at the DSWD building. They contended that the issuance of the reconstituting EOby Mayor Plaza and the designation of petitioner Tuazon as Officer-in-charge of the CSSDO are illegal. Despite Mayor Plazas series of orders to respondents to report for work at the DSWD building, they failed to do so. Because of this, Mayor Plaza issued an order dropping respondents from the rolls pursuant to the CSC Memorandum Circular.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the dropping of respondents from the roll is legal.

(2) WON respondents were denied due process for lack of notice and hearing.

(3) WON  the contention of respondents that it was really the intention of the mayor to systematically remove them was meritorious.

(4) WON the EO was valid.

(5) WON respondents' right to security of tenure has been violated as they were transferred without their consent.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The CSC Memorandum Circular provides that, "officers and employees who are absent for at least thirty (30) days without approved leave are considered on Absence Without Official Leave (AWOL) and may be dropped from the service without prior notice."

(2)  No. The separation of an employee who is dropped from the rolls is a non-disciplinary action wherein the respondent is entitled to notice and hearing. In the above-quoted provision, an officer or employee may be dropped from the rolls if he was continuously absent without official leave for a period of at least thirty days. Prior notice is not necessary.

(3) No. No evidence was submitted by the appellants to support such contention.

(4) Yes. Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of personnel, assets and liabilities, records of basic services, and facilities of a national government agency to local government units. Under this Code, the term devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities. Furthemore,  devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer. It is thus clear that Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue the EO in order to give effect to the devolution decreed by the LGC. As the local chief executive, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular head, as was done by the Mayor here. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1992, provides further that heads of departments appointed by the local chief executive must have the concurrence of the majority of all the members of the Sanggunian concerned. While initially, the Sanggunian rejected petitioner Tuazons appointment as the City Government Department Head II of the CSSDO, however, it later confirmed her appointment.

(5) No. There was no such transfer. Transfer is a movement from one position to another which is of equivalent rank, level or salary without break in service and may be imposed as an administrative penalty. The change of respondents place of work from the original CSSDO office to the DSWD building is not a transfer. It was only a physical transfer of their office to a new one done in the interest of public service. There were no new movements or appointments from one position to another.

BINAY v. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 92389, September 11, 1991 (Digested Case)

BINAY v. DOMINGO

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: The Municipality of Makati passed a resolution extending financial assistance to a bereaved family whose gross income does not exceed P2000  a month. The resolution was referred to respondent COA for its expected allowance in audit. However, COA disapproved the resolution and disallowed in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof. COA's objection is of the position that there is no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained under the resolution and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc., of the inhabitants of Makati. COA's also argued that. "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case."

ISSUES:

(1) WON the resolution of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.

(2) WON the classification of pauper beneficiaries is violative of  the equal protection clause in the constitution.

HELD:

(1) Yes. COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid) social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.

(2) No. There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation. Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.

SOLICITOR GENERAL v. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (MMA), 204 SCRA 837 (Digested Case)

SOLICITOR GENERAL v. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (MMA)

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: In the Gonong Case 1990, the Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605. It was there also observed that even the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. In the case at bar, the MMA issued an ordinance authorizing itself to detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila. On the other hand, private petitioners herein contended that the ordinance passed by MMA and the provisions of the decision in the Gonong Case were conflicting. The MMA argued that there was no conflict between the two. It stressed that the decision itself said that the confiscation of license plates was invalid in the absence of a valid law or ordinance, which was why the ordinance was enacted. The Authority also pointed out that the ordinance could not be attacked collaterally but only in a direct action challenging its validity.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the ordinance cannot be attacked collaterally.

(2) WON there was valid delegation of legislative power to MMA.

(3) WON the ordinance of MMA is valid.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The Metropolitan Manila Authority is correct in invoking the doctrine that the validity of a law or act can be challenged only in a direct action and not collaterally. That is indeed the settled principle. However, that rule is not inflexible and may be relaxed by the Court under exceptional circumstances, such as those in the present controversy.

(2) Yes. The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present. These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the presence of a sufficient standard. But the problem before us is not the validity of the delegation of legislative power. The question we must resolve is the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.

(3) No. A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanction. MMA and LGUs are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.

TATEL v. MUNICIPALTIY OF VIRAC, 207 SCRA 837 (Digested Case)

TATEL v. MUNICIPALTIY OF VIRAC

Re: General welfare clause (Sec. 16, LGC 1991)

FACTS: On the basis of complaints received from the residents, against the disturbance caused by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside the warehouse of petitioner, a committee was appointed by the municipal council of Virac to investigate the matter. Resultantly, Resolution No. 29 was passed, declaring the warehouse owned and operated by petitioner a public nuisance within the purview of Article 694 of the New Civil Code. Respondent municipal officials contend that petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance No. 13, series of 1952, prohibiting the construction of warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire. On the other hand, petitioner contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.

ISSUES:

(1) WON Ordinance No. 13 is valid.

(2) WON the appelate court erred in giving the ordinance a meaning other than and different from what it provided by declaring that petitioner violated the same by using the warehouse for storage of abaca and copra when what is prohibited and penalized by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses.

(3) WON the appelate court erred in refusing to take judicial notice of the fact that in the municipality, there are numerous establishments similarly situated as appellants' warehouses but which are not prosecuted.

HELD:

(1) Yes. The ordinance was passed by the municipal council in exercise of its police power. It is a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation. Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the LGC.

(2) No. The ambiguity therein therefore is more apparent than real and springs from simple error in grammatical construction but otherwise, the meaning and intent is clear that what is prohibited is the construction or maintenance of warehouses for the storage of inflammable articles at a distance within 200 meters from a block of houses either in the poblacion or in the barrios. And the purpose of the ordinance is to avoid loss of life and property in case of accidental fire which is one of the primordial and basic obligation of any government.

(3) No. As to the third assignment of error, that warehouses similarly situated as that of the petitioner were not prosecuted, suffice it to say that the mere fact that the municipal authorities of Virac have not proceeded against other warehouses in the municipality allegedly violating Ordinance No. 13 is no reason to claim that the ordinance is discriminatory. A distinction must be made between the law itself and the manner in which said law is implemented by the agencies in charge with its administration and enforcement. There is no valid reason for the petitioner to complain, in the absence of proof that the other bodegas mentioned by him are operating in violation of the ordinance and that the complaints have been lodged against the bodegas concerned without the municipal authorities doing anything about it.

TANO v. SOCRATES, 278 SCRA 154 (Digested Case)

TANO v. SOCRATES

Re: General principles (Sec. 1-5, LGC1991)

FACTS: The City Council of Puerto Princesa enacted an ordinance banning the shipment of live fish and lobster outside the City for 5 years. In the same light, the Provincial Council of Palawan also enacted a resolution that prohibits the catching, gathering, buying, selling, and possessing and shipment of live marine coral dwelling aquatic organisms for 5 years within the Palawan waters. The petitioners Airline Shippers Association of Palawan together with marine merchants were charged for violating said ordinance and resolution by the city and provincial governments. The petitioners now allege that the Ordinances deprived them of due process of law, their livelihood, and unduly restricted them from the practice of their trade, in violation of Section 2, Article XII and Sections 2 and 7 of Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution; that the Office Order No. 23 contained no regulation nor condition under which the Mayors permit could be granted or denied; in other words, the Mayor had the absolute authority to determine whether or not to issue permit; and that the Ordinance No. 2 of the Province of Palawan altogether prohibited the catching, gathering, possession, buying, selling and shipping of live marine coral dwelling organisms, without any distinction whether it was caught or gathered through lawful fishing method, the Ordinance took away the right of petitioners-fishermen to earn their livelihood in lawful ways

ISSUES: WON the assailed ordinances and resolution are valid.

HELD: Yes. The LGC vests municipalities with the power to grant fishery privileges in municipal waters and to impose rentals, fees or charges therefor; to penalize, by appropriate ordinances, the use of explosives, noxious or poisonous substances, electricity, muro-ami, and other deleterious methods of fishing; and to prosecute any violation of the provisions of applicable fishery laws. Further, the sangguniang bayan, the sangguniang panlungsod and the sangguniang panlalawigan are directed to enact ordinances for the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants, which shall include, inter alia, ordinances that protect the environment and impose appropriate penalties for acts which endanger the environment such as dynamite fishing and other forms of destructive fishing ... and such other activities which result in pollution, acceleration of eutrophication of rivers and lakes or of ecological imbalance. Further, one of the devolved powers enumerated in the section of the LGC on devolution is the enforcement of fishery laws in municipal waters including the conservation of mangroves.[30] This necessarily includes enactment of ordinances to effectively carry out such fishery laws within the municipal waters.

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES, 234 SCRA 255 (Digested Case)

MAGTAJAS v. PRYCE PROPERTIES

Re: General principles (Sec. 1-5, LGC 1991)

FACTS: PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. It enacted ordinances which both prohibit the issuance of business permit and cancel existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof for the operation of casino, and impose penalty thereto. The petitioners argue that LGUs may prohibit the operation of casinos because they involve games of chance, which are detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by general law and even by the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred upon local government units may be exercised over all kinds of gambling and not only over "illegal gambling" as the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: WON LGUs are empowered to enact ordinances prohibiting the operation of PAGCOR within the formers' jurisdiction.

HELD: No. We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines, remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by the Local Government Code, which empowers the local government units to prevent or suppress "only" those forms of "gambling prohibited" by law. Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their praiseworthy motives, these ordinances are contrary to P.D. 1869 and the public policy announced therein and are therefore ultra vires and void.

EVARDONE v. COMELEC, 204 SCRA 464 (Digested Case)

EVARDONE v. COMELEC

Re: General principles (Sec. 1-5, LGC 1991)

FACTS: Petitioner Evardone is the mayor of Municipality of Sulat. Herein respondents filed a petition for recall with the Office of the Local Election Registrar (LER) in said municipality against said mayor. The respondent COMELEC issued a resolution, approving the recommendation of the LER, to hold the signing of the petition for recall. On July 10, 1990, Evardone prayed for a TRO which was favorably issued on July 12, 1990. On the same day, July 12, the TRO was received by the central office of COMELEC. But it was only in July 15 that the field agent of the respondent COMELEC received the telegraphic notice of the TRO—a day after the completion of the signing process sought to be temporarily stopped by the TRO. Thereafter, the respondent COMELEC nullified the signing process held in Sulat, Eastern Samar for being violative of the order (the TRO) of this Court. The COMELEC held that the critical date to consider is the service or notice of the Restraining Order on 12 July 1990 upon the principal i.e. the Commission on Election, and not upon its agent in the field. Evardone however argued that the resolution earlier issued by respondent is null and void as he maintained that Article X, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution repealed Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 in favor of one to be enacted by Congress. Since there was, during the period material to this case, no local government code enacted by Congress after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution nor any law for that matter on the subject of recall of elected government officials, Evardone contends that there is no basis for COMELEC Resolution No. 2272 and that the recall proceedings in the case at bar is premature.

ISSUES:

(1) WON the adoption of the 1987 Constitution abrogated the provisions of BP 337, and therefore, COMELEC indeed has no basis in conducting the recall.

(2) WON the TRO issued by this Court rendered nugatory the signing process of the petition for recall held pursuant to the questioned resolution.

HELD:

(1)  No. Article XVIII, Section 3 of the 1987 Constitution expressly provides that all existing laws not inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution shall remain operative, until amended, repealed or revoked. RA 7160 providing for the LGC 1991, approved by the President on 10 October 1991, specifically repeals BP 337 as provided in Sec. 534, Title Four of said Act. But the LGC 1991 will take effect only on 1 January 1992 and therefore the old LGC (BP 337) is still the law applicable to the present case. Prior to the enactment of the new LGC, the effectiveness of BP 337 was expressly recognized in the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.  Thus, the COMELEC was vested the power to promulgate the questioned resolution.

(2) No. Indeed, this Court issued a TRO on 12 July 1990 but the signing of the petition for recall took place just the same on the scheduled date through no fault of the respondent COMELEC and Apelado, et al. The signing process was undertaken by the constituents of the Municipality of Sulat and its Election Registrar in good faith and without knowledge of the TRO earlier issued by this Court. As attested by Election Registrar Sumbilla, about 2,050 of the 6,090 registered voters of Sulat, Eastern Samar or about 34% signed the petition for recall. As held in Parades vs. Executive Secretary, there is no turning back the clock. Thus, the signing process held last 14 July 1990 in Sulat, Eastern Samar, for the recall of Mayor Felipe P. Evardone of said municipality is valid and has legal effect. However, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation provided in Sec. 55 (2) of B.P. Blg, 337, which states: (2) No recall shall take place within two years from the date of the official's assumption of office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election.

NB: Petitions are DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

MALABANG v. BENITO, G.R. No. L-28113, March 28, 1969 (Digested Case)

Re: De facto municipal corporation

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of EO 386 of the then President Carlos P. Garcia, which created the Municipality of Balabagan out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. Petitioner relied on the ruling in Pelaez v. Auditor General while respondent contended that  that the rule announced in Pelaez can have no application in this case because unlike the municipalities involved in Pelaez, the municipality of Balabagan is at least a de facto corporation, having been organized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers having been either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporate functions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as a de facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquired into directly in an action for quo warranto at the instance of the State and not of an individual like the petitioner Balindong.

WON:

(1) WON the controverted matter may be attacked collateraly.

(2) WON EO 386 is constitutional.

HELD:

(1) Yes. It is indeed true that, generally, an inquiry into the legal existence of a municipality is reserved to the State in a proceeding for quo warranto or other direct proceeding, and that only in a few exceptions may a private person exercise this function of government. But the rule disallowing collateral attacks applies only where the municipal corporation is at least a de facto corporations. For where it is neither a corporation de jure nor de facto, but a nullity, the rule is that its existence may be, questioned collaterally or directly in any action or proceeding by any one whose rights or interests are affected thereby, including the citizens of the territory incorporated unless they are estopped by their conduct from doing so.

(2) No. In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact that the statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on the consideration that there was some other "valid law" giving corporate vitality to the organization. Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when the statute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as, independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is "no other valid statute to give color of authority to its creation".

Juanito Mariano v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 118577, March 7, 1995 (Digested Case)

Re: Based on verifiable indicators of viability/projected capacity

FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA 7854 which sought to convert the Municipality of Makati to a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati. Petitioners contend that the special law did not properly identify, in metes and bounds with technical descriptions, the territorial jurisdiction of Makati; that it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials; that it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law; that the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill; and that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with the population requirement, thus violative of the constitution and the LGC.

HELD:

(1) WON RA 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.

(2) WON it attempted to alter or restart the "three consecutive term" limit for local elective officials.

(3) WON it is unconstitutional for it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years following the return of every census.

(4) WON it is unconstitutional for the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the bill.

(5) WON it is unconstitutional for the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000. Said section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one representative.

HELD:

(1) No. Petitioners have not demonstrated that the delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries. We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by Makati as a municipality. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 of RA 7854 stated that, the city's land area "shall comprise the present territory of the municipality." The court take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government units with unsettled boundary dispute.

(2) No. The requirements before a litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself. Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty elections; that he would be reelected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has no jurisdiction.

(3) No. The Constitution clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than two hundred fifty (250) members, "unless otherwise fixed by law". As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854 and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate period of time.

(4) No. The Constitution does not command that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to such general subject.

(5) No. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional representative.

LOPEZ v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-56022, May 31, 1985 (Digested Case)

LOPEZ v. COMELEC (1985)

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: After a referedum in 1975 wherein residents of the Greater Manila area authorized the  President to restructure the local governments of the four cities and 13 municipalities thereof into an integrated unit of the manager or commission form of government, PD 824 was issued by the President creating a public corporation to be known as the Metropolitan Manila vested with the powers and attributes of a corporation. Petitioners herein assailed the constitutionality of PD 824 relying on the provision of the LGC (enacted in 1983): "No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected".

ISSUES:

(1) WON PD 824 is unconstitutional.

(2) WON PD 824 violated the equal protection clause of the constitution.

HELD:

(1) No. The doubt on the creation of PD 824 has been removed by the present Constitutional provision and in the Article on Batasang Pambansa that both recognized the existence of the Metropolitan Manila. Furthermore, the plebiscite conducted in 1975 manifested the will of the residence of the area which thus satisfied the provision relied upon by petitioners. It is to be noted likewise that at the time of such plebiscite in February, 1975, there was no Local Government Code.

(2) No. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same. It is clear that under the equal protection clause, classification is not forbidden. As was so well put by Justice Laurel as ponente in the leading case People v. Vera: "Class legislation discriminating against some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and not made arbitrarily or capriciously is permitted." Here, PD 824 has complied with the requirements of valid classification.

*Nota Bene: The president may only excercise general supervision over Metropolitan Manila, contrary to what was previously stipulated therein granting the president the power to control it.